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Abstract
Centralized Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) when
used in distributed systems have performance constraints
as all traffic must traverse through a central server. In re-
cent years, there has been a paradigm shift towards the
use of P2P in VPNs to alleviate pressure placed upon the
central server by allowing participants to communicate
directly with each other, relegating the server to handling
session management and supporting NAT traversal using
relays when necessary. Another, less common, approach
uses unstructured P2P systems to remove all centraliza-
tion from the VPN. These approaches currently lack the
depth in security options provided by other VPN solu-
tions, and their scalability constraints have not been well
studied.
In this paper, we propose and implement a novel VPN
architecture, which uses a structured P2P system for peer
discovery, session management, NAT traversal, and auto-
nomic relay selection and a central server as a partially-
automated public key infrastructure (PKI) via a user-
friendly web interface. Our model also provides the first
design and implementation of a P2P VPN with full tun-
neling support, whereby all non-P2P based Internet traf-
fic routes through a trusted third party and does so in a
way that is more secure than existing full tunnel tech-
niques. To verify our model, we evaluate our reference
implementation by comparing it quantitatively to other
VPN technologies focusing on latency, bandwidth, and
memory usage. We also discuss some of our experiences
with developing, maintaining, and deploying a P2P VPN.
1 Introduction
A Virtual Private Network (VPN) provides the illusion of
a Local Area Network (LAN) spanning a wide area net-
work (WAN) infrastructure by creating secure and au-
thenticated communication links amongst participants.
Common uses of VPNs include secure access to enter-
prise network resources from remote/insecure locations,
connecting distributed resources from multiple sites, and
establishing virtual LANs for multiplayer video games
over the Internet. In the context of this paper, we fo-
cus on VPNs that provide connectivity amongst individ-
ual resources each configured with VPN software. Our
work is significantly different in scope from approaches
that define VPNs “as the ‘emulation of a private Wide
Area Network (WAN) facility using IP facilities’ (includ-
ing the public Internet or private IP backbones).” [20].
The purpose of these VPNs is to connect large sets of
machines through virtual routers to a virtual WAN envi-
ronment.
The architecture described in this paper addresses a
usage scenario where participants desire VPN connectiv-
ity without incurring the complexity or management cost
of traditional VPNs. For instance, in a small/medium
business (SMB) environment, it is often desirable to in-
terconnect desktops and servers across distributed sites,
provide authenticated access and encrypted traffic to en-
terprise networked resources, and secure Internet traffic
from mobile users at untrusted locations. Another exam-
ple is collaborative academic environments linking in-
dividuals belonging to a virtual organization spanning
multiple institutions, where coordinated configuration of
network infrastructure across different sites is often im-
practical. Existing approaches suffer from one or more
limitations that hinder their applicability in these scenar-
ios: centralized approaches (e.g. OpenVPN [42]) incur
the management cost of dedicated infrastructures. Al-
ternative P2P-based approaches (e.g. Hamachi [26]) are
vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks if session man-
agement is handled by an external provider; furthermore,
they lack the support to tunnel traffic to Internet hosts
through the VPN.
Among existing VPN approaches [42, 26, 30, 19, 10,
36], there is not a single solution that provides the follow-
ing in an integrated manner: no dependence on central-
ized server(s) for creation, maintenance and tear-down of
VPN links; completely secure full tunneling of Internet
traffic; decentralized relay selection, where any peer can
potentially be a relay; and user-friendly, intuitive mem-
bership management in a VPN.
Our system supports the well-known PKI-based secu-
rity model to secure VPN links; for improved usability,
we employ a semi-automated PKI managed through a
group-based web interface. The interface allows VPN
group managers to review applications into the group and
remove malicious users. Furthermore, we use the boot-
strapping of a private P2P system off an existing pub-
lic P2P system to create a trusted P2P system that spans
only the members of a VPN group providing secure P2P
routing and distributed hash table (DHT) storage. We
explore the problem of providing full tunneling to P2P
VPNs and provide a working solution that supports mul-
tiple gateways in a single VPN. We provide mechanisms
that allow peers to establish NAT tunneling two-hop re-
lay links based upon node stability (uptime) and proxim-
ity (latency) when direct connectivity is unavailable (e.g.
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due to NAT traversal constraints). The main contribution
of this paper is the design and evaluation of a novel struc-
tured P2P VPN overlay architecture. While many of the
individual components of our solution are not novel in
and of themselves, the integration of these components
and their interaction results in a unique system.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 gives an overview of current VPN technologies.
Section 3 provides background on P2P systems. Sec-
tion 4 describes the techniques used to create structured
P2P VPNs. In Section 5, we present evaluation compar-
ing our system with other VPNs. Our experience devel-
oping, using, and debugging the system is discussed in
Section 6. Section 7 discusses related works, while Sec-
tion 8 presents concluding remarks.
2 Virtual Private Networks
There exist many different flavors of virtual networking.
This paper focuses on those that are used to create or ex-
tend a virtual layer 3 network, of which there are many
types as summarized in Table 1. A brief survey of popu-
lar VPNs comprising different configurations is summa-
rized in Table 2. This section overviews core features
of VPN designs, beginning with client configuration of
VPNs, followed by an analysis of different VPN server
configurations as highlighted in Table 1.
Type Description
Centralized
Clients communicate through one
or more servers which are statically
configured
Centralized
Servers / P2P
Clients
Servers provide authentication, ses-
sion management, and optionally
relay traffic; peers may communi-
cate directly with each other via
P2P links if NAT traversal succeeds
Decentralized
Servers and
Clients
No distinction between clients and
servers; each member in the sys-
tem authenticates directly with each
other; links between members must
be explicitly defined
Unstructured
P2P
No distinction between clients and
servers; members either know the
entire network or use broadcast to
discover routes between each other
Structured
P2P
No distinction between clients and
servers; members are usually within
O(logN) hops of each other via a
greedy routing algorithm; use dis-
tributed data store for discovery
Table 1: VPN Classifications
2.1 Client VPN Configuration
In Figure 1, we abstract the common features of all
VPNs clients. The key components of a client machine
are 1) client software that communicates with the VPN
overlay and 2) a virtual network (VN) device. During
initialization, the VPN software starts by authenticat-
ing with an overlay or VPN agent. Then, optionally, it
queries the agent for information about the network, such
as the network address space, and finally the VN device
is started enabling secure communication amongst par-
ticipants.
Figure 1: A typical VPN client. The VPN uses a VN device
to make interaction over the VPN transparent. Packets going
to VPN destinations are directed towards the VN device, which
interfaces the VPN client. The VPN client in turn sends and
receives packets over the hosts physical network device.
There are many different mechanisms for communi-
cating with an overlay agent. For quick setup, a sys-
tem may require no authentication or use a shared secret
such as a key or password. Using accounts and pass-
words with or without a shared secret provides individu-
alized authentication, allowing an administrator to block
all users if the shared secret is compromised or individ-
ual users if they act maliciously. For the strongest level
of security, each client can be configured to have a unique
signed certificate that makes brute force attacks very dif-
ficult. The trade-offs come in terms of usability and man-
agement. While the use of signed certificates provides
better security than shared secrets, it can be more diffi-
cult to set up and use. In a system comprising of non-
experts, the typical setup includes the use of a shared se-
cret and individual user accounts, where the shared secret
is included with the installation of the VPN application
which is distributed from a secured site.
To communicate over the VPN transparently, a system
must have a VN device driver, which provides the mech-
anisms to inject incoming packets and retrieve outgoing
packets from the networking stack, enabling the use of
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common network APIs such as Berkeley Sockets allow-
ing existing application to work over the VPN without
modification. There are many different types of VN de-
vices, though due to our focus on an open platform, we
focus on TAP [24]. TAP allows the creation of one or
more Virtual Ethernet and / or IP devices and is avail-
able for almost all modern operating systems including
Windows, Linux, Mac OS/X, BSD, and Solaris. A TAP
device presents itself as a character device providing read
and write operations. Incoming packets from the VN are
written to the TAP device and the networking stack in the
OS delivers the packet to the appropriate socket. Outgo-
ing packets from local sockets are read from the TAP
device.
The VN device can be configured manually through
static addressing or dynamically through dynamic host
configuration process (DHCP) [11]. Setting the IP ad-
dress of the VN device causes the system to add a new
rule to the routing table that directs all packets sent to the
VPN address space to be sent to the VN device. Pack-
ets are read from the the TAP device, encrypted and sent
to the overlay via the VPN client. The overlay deliv-
ers the packet to another client or a server with a VN
stack enabled. Received packets are decrypted, veri-
fied for authenticity, and then written to the TAP device.
In most cases, the IP layer header remains unchanged,
while VPN configuration determines how the Ethernet
header is handled.
The described configuration so far creates what is
known as a split tunnel: a VPN connection that han-
dles internal VPN traffic only and not Internet traffic.
VPNs can also support full tunneling, which allows a
VPN client to securely forward all their Internet traffic
through a VPN router. This provides network-layer pri-
vacy and authentication when a user is in an insecure en-
vironment, such as an open wireless network at a coffee
shop, by securely relaying all Internet traffic through a
trusted third party, the VPN gateway. Both models are
illustrated in Figure 2.
Figure 2: A VPN setup expressing both full and split tunnel
modes. In both modes, packets for the server are sent directly
to the server. In split tunnel mode, Internet packets bypass the
VPN and are routed directly to the Internet. In full tunnel mode,
Internet packets are first routed to the VPN server / gateway,
and then to their Internet destination.
Most centralized VPNs implement full tunneling
through a routing rule swap, which makes the default
gateway an endpoint in the VPN subnet and traffic for the
VPN server is routed explicitly to the LAN gateway. For
example, in a typical home network, an Internet bound
packet will be retrieved at the VN device, encrypted, and
sent to the VPN gateway via the LAN’s gateway. At the
VPN gateway, the packet is decrypted and delivered to
the Internet. A P2P system encounters two challenges in
supporting full tunnels: 1) P2P traffic must not be routed
to the VPN gateway and 2) there may be more than one
VPN gateway. We further discuss this issue and provide
solutions to this problem in Section 4.3.
2.2 Centralized VPN Servers
OpenVPN is an open and well-documented platform
for deploying centralized VPNs. We use it as the basis
for comparison with our approach, as it provides a rep-
resentation of features found in most centralized VPNs.
Centralized VPNs are responsible for authentication and
routing between clients, providing a NAT to the servers
local resources and Internet (full tunnel), and handling
inter-server communication.
Central VPN servers operate at well-known endpoints
consisting of a hostname or IP address and a port. In
a system containing multiple servers, a client attempt-
ing to log in will randomly attempt to connect to one of
the servers until successful, implementing a simple load
balance. Once connected, clients obtain an address in
the VPN address space. Depending on configuration this
will allow a client to communicate with other clients, re-
sources on the same network as the server, or Internet
hosts via the VPN. In such situations, it is important that
the client and server both authenticate with each other in
using some form of challenge response protocol.
All inter-client communication flows through the cen-
tral server. In the default configuration of OpenVPN, a
client encrypts a packet and sends it to the server. The
server receives the packet, decrypts it, determines where
to relay it, and then encrypts and sends the packet to its
destination. This model does not prevent a server from
eavesdropping on such communication. While a second
layer of encryption is possible through a shared secret,
it requires out-of-band communication and is less secure
than relying on a PKI.
To support full tunneling or allow the client to access
the server’s resources, the server too must enable client-
like features by becoming a VPN endpoint with a VN
device. Depending on the configuration, the server can
then configure traffic from the VPN to go through a NAT
prior to routing it to the LAN and/or Internet.
OpenVPN allows a distribution of servers, so as to pro-
vide fault tolerance and to a lesser degree load balancing.
Servers must be configured to know about each other in
advance and need routing rules established to forward
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VPN Type AuthenticationMethod
Peer Discov-
ery NAT Traversal Availability
OpenVPN [42] Centralized
Certificates or
passwords with
a central server
Central
server(s)
Relay through
server(s) Open Source
tinc [36] Decentralized PKI Broadcast Relay through mesh Open Source
CloudVPN [12] Decentralized PKI Broadcast Relay through mesh Open Source
Hamachi [26] CentralizedP2P
Password at cen-
tral server
Central
server
NAT traversal and
centralized relay
limited free-use, limited
Non-Windows clients,
no private relays
GBridge [25] CentralizedP2P
Password at cen-
tral server
Central
server
NAT traversal, cen-
tralized relay
Windows only, free-
ware, no private relays
Wippien [30] CentralizedP2P
Password at cen-
tral server
Central
server
NAT traversal, no
relay support
Mixed Open / Closed
source
N2N [10] UnstructuredP2P Shared secret Broadcast
NAT traversal, de-
centralized relay Open Source
P2PVPN [19] UnstructuredP2P Shared secret Broadcast
No NAT traversal,
decentralized relay Open Source
IPOP StructuredP2P
PKI or pre-
exchanged keys
DHT look
up
NAT traversal and
relay through physi-
cally close peers
Open Source
Table 2: VPN Comparison
packets. Load balancing exists only in the process of the
client randomly connecting to different servers and po-
tentially with a server refusing connection due to load.
The current approach lacks a distributed load balance.
Two examples of systems that assist in distributing
load in VPN systems are tinc [36] and CloudVPN [12].
Unlike the decentralized P2P systems, these decentral-
ized systems lack the ability to self-organize the VPN
and require explicit specification of which links to create.
This means that, like OpenVPN, these systems can suffer
VPN outages when nodes go offline. The difference be-
ing that OpenVPN makes it explicit who is a server and
who is not, whereas in tinc and CloudVPN anyone can
be a server or a client. In the typical tinc and CloudVPN
setup, individual users share endpoints with each other
out of band and then place them in the VPN configura-
tion file. Due to the lack of self-configuration, members
in the system will not replace links as members go of-
fline.
2.3 Centralized P2P VPN Systems
Hamachi [26] began the advent of centralized VPNs
that went with the ambiguous moniker “P2P VPN”. In
reality, these systems would be best classified as central-
ized VPN servers with P2P clients. Specifically, the na-
ture of P2P in these [30, 25] types of systems provides
direct connectivity between clients once authenticated by
a central server. While direct connection is desirable, it
does not always happen due to firewalls or impenetra-
ble NATs. When this happens, the central server either
acts as a relay, if not, the two machines are unable to
communicate. One concern is that each of these imple-
mentations uses their own security protocols that involve
using a server to verify the authenticity and setup secure
connections between clients. Most of these projects are
closed preventing users from hosting their own authen-
tication servers and relays. This model forces users to
trust the third-party server to not eavesdrop or perform
other man-in-the-middle attacks. None of these provide
support for full tunneling.
2.4 P2P VPN Client / Server Roles
Unlike centralized systems, pure (or decentralized)
P2P systems have no concept of dedicated servers,
though it is entirely possible to add reliability to the sys-
tem by starting dedicated instances of the P2P VPN. In
these systems, all participants are members of a collec-
tive known as an overlay. Current generation P2P de-
centralized VPNs use unstructured P2P networks, where
there are no guarantees about distance and routability be-
tween peers. Two popular examples of unstructured P2P
VPNs are N2N [10] and P2PVPN1 [19]. As a result, par-
ticipants tend to be connected to a random distribution
of peers in the overlay. Finding a peer requires some
form of broadcasting, either announcements or searches,
to the entire overlay. While unstructured P2P systems
have some scalability concerns, P2P systems in general
1Due to the similarities between the name P2PVPN and focus of
this paper, we use “P2PVPN” to refer only to [19] and “P2P VPN” to
refer explicitly to our approach.
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allow for server-less systems. In the realm of VPNs, all
client VPNs are also servers with varying responsibili-
ties depending on the VPN application, as we present in
Table 2.
Typically, decentralized, P2P VPNs begin by attempt-
ing to connect with well-known endpoints running the
P2P overlay software. A list of such end points can be
maintained by occasionally querying the overlay for ac-
tive participants on public IP addresses and distributing
the list with the application or some other out-of-band
mechanism. In the case of P2PVPN, this involves com-
munication with one or more BitTorrent trackers to find
other members of the P2PVPN group. N2N [10] requires
knowledge of an existing peer in the system. It uses this
endpoint to bootstrap more connections to other peers in
the system, allowing the application to be an active par-
ticipant in the overlay and potentially be a bootstrap con-
nection for other peers attempting to connect.
3 Structured Peer-to-Peer Systems
Structured P2P systems provide distributed look up
services with guaranteed search time in O(logN) to
O(log
2
N) time, in contrast to unstructured systems,
which rely on global knowledge/broadcasts, or stochastic
techniques such as random walks [5]. Some examples of
structured systems can be found in [34, 37, 27, 28, 31]. In
general, structured systems are able to make these guar-
antees by self-organizing a structured topology such as a
2D ring or a hypercube.
The node ID, drawn from a large address space, must
be unique to each peer, otherwise an address collision
occurs which can prevent nodes from participating in
the overlay. Furthermore, having the node IDs well dis-
tributed assist in providing better scalability as many
algorithms for selection of shortcuts depend on having
node IDs uniformly distributed across the entire address
space. A simple mechanism to ensure this is to have each
node use a cryptographically strong random number gen-
erator. Another mechanism for distributing node IDs in-
volves the use of a trusted third party to generate node
IDs and cryptographically sign them [6].
As with unstructured P2P systems, in order for an in-
coming node to connect with the system it must know of
at least one active participant. A list of nodes that are
running on public addresses should be maintained and
distributed with the application, available through some
out-of-band mechanism, or possibly using multicast to
find pools [34].
Depending on the protocol, a node must be connected
to either the closest neighbor smaller, larger, or both. Op-
timizations for fault tolerance suggest that it should be
between 2 to log(N) on both sides. If a peer does not
know the address of its immediate predecessor or succes-
sor and a message is routed through it destined for them,
depending on the message type, it may either be locally
consumed or thrown away, never arriving at its appro-
priate destination. Thus having multiple peers on both
sides assist in stabilizing when the experiencing churn,
particularly when peers leave without warning.
Overlay shortcuts enable efficient routing in ring-
structured P2P systems. The different shortcut selection
methods include: maintaining large tables without us-
ing connections and only verifying usability when rout-
ing messages [34, 28], maintaining a connection with a
peer every set distance in the P2P address space [37], or
using locations drawn from a harmonic distribution in the
node address space [27].
4 Components of a P2P VPN
Before presenting our contributions, we first review our
current work as it provides the basis for our P2P VPN. At
the heart of our system lies a P2P system similar to Sym-
phony [27] named Brunet [4]. The specific components
of the system that make it interesting for use in a P2P
VPN system include: STUN NAT traversal [33], system
stability when two nodes next to each other in address
space cannot directly connect [17], proximity-based se-
lection of shortcuts [17], a distributed data store based
upon a DHT [18], and self-optimizing shortcuts to sup-
port single-hop connectivity between peers when virtual
IP traffic is detected between endpoints [16].
We have implemented a VN on top of the Brunet P2P
library with the following features: self-configuring, low
overhead use [41, 15], address configuration through a
virtual DHCP server using DHT [41, 18], ability to be-
have as a VN interface or router [41], and secure end-to-
end (EtE) and point-to-point (PtP) links. Our implemen-
tation is portable to any system that supports Tap and a
C# run-time (e.g. Mono, .Net), and has been used in grid
computing for over 3 years [14, 39, 38, 40].
While this framework provides the basis for our design
and implementation, we will show in this paper that our
approach generalizes to other structured P2P systems.
4.1 Automating security configuration
Our VPN supports the PKI model, where a central-
ized CA signs all client certificates and clients can ver-
ify each other without CA interaction by using the CA’s
public certificate. However, setting up, deploying, and
then maintaining security credentials can easily become
a non-negligible task, especially for non-experts. Most
PKI-enabled VPN systems require the use of command-
line utilities, setting up your own methods of securely
deploying certificates and policing users. All these tech-
niques can be applied in the P2P VPN of this paper, but
our experience with real deployments of our system in-
dicates that usability is very important, which is why we
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sought a model with easy to user interfaces. In this sec-
tion, we present our solution, a partially automated PKI
reliant on a redistributable group based web interface.
Although this does not preclude other methods of CA
interaction, our experience has shown that it provides a
model that is satisfactory for many use cases.
In order to obtain certificates, a user creates an account
and joins a group through a Web interface, providing rel-
evant information as to the reason for joining the group.
Users can also create VPN groups of their own through
the interface, in effect becoming the administrator of the
VPN group. One or more group VPN administrators can
verify this information and approve or deny the user ac-
cess into the group. If a user is granted access, they are
then able to download a configuration blob. The blob
contains VPN network configuration and a shared key
that uniquely identifies the user and allowing them to au-
tomatically retrieve signed certificates in the future. The
user configures the VPN client with the blob. Upon start-
ing, the VPN client queries the group server using the in-
formation in the blob to authenticate the server and itself
to the server. After which, the user provides the group
server a certificate request containing the VPN client’s
node ID, which the server signs and returns. At which
point, the VPN client can connect to the VPN pool and
communicate securely with others in the group. It is im-
perative that any operations that involve the exchanging
of secret information, such as the shared secret, be per-
formed over a secure transport, such as HTTPS, which
can be done with no user intervention.
Unlike decentralized systems that use shared secrets,
in which the creator of the VPN becomes powerless to
control malicious users, a PKI enables the creator to ef-
fectively remove malicious users. The methods that we
have incorporated include: use of a certificate revoca-
tion list (CRL) hosted on the group server, DHT events
requesting notification of peer removal from the group,
and broadcasting to the entire P2P system the revocation
of the peer.
A CRL offers an out of band mechanism for distribut-
ing user revocations. The CRL assist in cases where a
malicious user can use common P2P attacks to prevent
notification of certificate revocations transmitted via the
overlay, as it is significantly more difficult to prevent the
retrieval of a CRL.
The DHT method acts as an event notification. Upon a
revocation, the CA retrieves the values at a DHT key spe-
cific to the revoked peer. The values contain node IDs of
nodes who want to know of the revocation. The problem
with a DHT is that it can be easily compromised if they
have not been implemented with significant measures to
protect against maliciousness.
The most rudimentary mechanism is broadcasting the
certificate revocation over the entire P2P overlay. In
small networks, the cost of such a broadcast may be neg-
ligible, but as a network grows, such a broadcast may
become prohibitively expensive.
4.2 Bootstrapping Private Overlays
In P2P systems, distributed security may not provide
the same level of security as centralized or managed se-
curity. A starting point to secure an overlay is to use
well-known security concepts such as PKI and SSL to
encourage wider adoption of P2P systems. One problem
with this approach though is that users who want a pri-
vate overlay may not have the resources, i.e. public ad-
dresses, to host their own overlays. To address this, we
suggest bootstrapping a private overlay from an existing
public overlay [7]. Communication within the private
overlay is completely encrypted and authenticated with
only members of the VPN allowed access.
In this approach, members of the VPN are the only
participants of the private overlay, providing a model that
is synergistic with the group VPN interface described
earlier. This prevents malicious users outside of the VPN
from attacking it, and facilitates the removal of misbe-
having peers, primarily rooted in the fact that the use of
a broadcast to signal a certificate revocation is within the
scope of the private overlay.
The process for bootstrapping a private overlay is as
follows. Once the VPN software begins, it starts by con-
necting with the public overlay. It queries the public
overlay’s DHT at the key “private:groupname”, where
groupname is the GroupVPN’s name. The values stored
at the key are the public overlay node IDs of the pri-
vate overlays active members. The joining VPN software
will attempt to form private overlay bootstrap connec-
tions with members of this list using the public overlay.
During this process, both peers verify each other’s au-
thenticity and form a secure connection. This connection
is then used to bootstrap direct connections with mem-
bers of the private overlay. The reason why the public
overlay node IDs are stored at the public overlay’s DHT
key and for using private overlay bootstrap connections
over the public overlay is to support NAT traversal. This
model supports reusing Brunet’s underlying NAT traver-
sal techniques. As a member of a private overlay, a VPN
node can elect to store information relevant to the VPN
in the private overlay’s DHT, relegating the public over-
lay for private overlay discovery. VPN traffic can then
be kept to the private overlay only or the public overlay
can be used for relaying, when direct connectivity is not
possible, though this has not been looked into yet.
4.3 Full Tunneling over P2P
In full tunnel mode, all traffic to both VPN and Inter-
net hosts with the exception of VPN “control” messages
route over the VPN, as shown in Figure 2. In a central-
ized VPN, these “control” messages consist of commu-
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nication with the VPN server and full tunnel gateway. In
a P2P VPN, “control” messages consists of communi-
cation between Using full tunneling ensures that a mali-
cious user cannot easily eavesdrop into what would oth-
erwise be public communication by forwarding all non-
VPN related traffic securely to a third party who resides
in a more trusted environment. There are two key com-
ponents to this scheme, a gateway / server or traffic re-
layer and a client or a traffic forwarder. In the following
sections, we present methods for implementing gateways
and clients.
4.3.1 The Gateway
Configuring a machine as a gateway can be done with
NAT software or using IPOP’s built-in NAT stack. For
example, in Linux this is possible through masquerad-
ing in iptables, which automatically handles forwarding
packets received on one interface to the next hop as well
as receiving packets from the Internet and forwarding
them back to the appropriate client, transparently taking
care of NAT.
With a gateway intact, the VPN software can now an-
nounce that it provides full tunneling. For that purpose,
we added an enable flag into the VPN configuration to
specify that a machine is a full tunnel gateway. When
the VPN software starts, it will automatically append it-
self to the list of known gateways for the VPN group in
the DHT.
The only remaining difference in VPN gateway is the
state machine used in processing packets coming from
the VPN. Rather than rejecting packets if the destination
is not in the VPN subnet, they are only rejected if gate-
way mode is disabled. If it is enabled, all Internet packets
are written to the TAP device with the destination Ether-
net address being that of the TAP device. The remaining
configuration is identical to other members of the system
as packets from the Internet to the client will automati-
cally have the clients IP as the destination as a product of
the NAT.
4.3.2 The Client
VPN Clients wishing to use full tunnel must redirect
their default traffic to their VN device. In our VPN
model, we use a virtual address for the purpose of provid-
ing distributed VN services DHCP and DNS. This same
address can be used as the VPN gateway, which works
fine because as shown in Figure 3, only the Ethernet
header contains information about the gateway. Packets
retrieved in the VPN software can then forward the In-
ternet packet to any machine in the VPN, providing gate-
way services without changing IP or higher OSI layer
changes.
The VPN’s state machine has to be slightly modified to
handle outgoing packets not destined for a remote VPN
end point. Incoming packets destined for a subnet out-
side of the VPN address space are rejected, unless full
tunnel client mode is enabled. If it is enabled, the VPN
software finds a remote peer to act as a full tunnel gate-
way and then sends the packet to the remote peer.
Figure 3: The contents of a full tunnel Ethernet packet. PN and
VN are defined as physical and virtual network, respectively.
The pathway for packets coming from the overlay
needs to support full tunneling. The source IP address
will not match the VPN gateways IP but will be an Inter-
net address. Thus the VPN client must confirm that the
source is a VPN gateway, otherwise the packet is thrown
away. Upon writing a packet to the VN device, the user
application will receive a packet from the Internet.
This leads to two issues: how to select the machine to
use as a gateway and how to configure a network stack
to properly route packets and not direct all packets to the
VPN gateway. Our model uses a simple mechanism for
determining which gateway to choose: query the DHT
for a list of potential gateways, select a random one from
the list, and verify liveness via periodic ping messages.
For handling faults, we take a pessimistic approach, that
is, if a server is lost, we take note of it and only query the
DHT again upon the next outgoing Internet packet.
In this paper, we focus on the second issue: handling
P2P-routed packets. In the centralized VPN case, a client
communicates directly with a single point in the VPN,
which is known ahead of time and can be implemented
by a simple routing rule swap prior to starting the VPN.
The same cannot be done for a P2P system. Due to
the dynamic, self-configuring nature of P2P systems, en-
suring that all P2P overlay messages are routed directly
becomes a non-trivial issue as there will be many such
routes, most of which will not be known ahead of time.
If we applied the same model used by centralized VPNs,
the client would end up routing both Internet and P2P
traffic through the gateway machine, creating a central
point of failure. We have considered two approaches, as
outlined below.
4.3.3 The Client – Approach 1 – Adding Routes
The first approach is similar to the centralized version:
for each P2P link, we add an explicit rule in the rout-
ing table so that packets destined for those endpoints are
routed directly to them via the LAN’s default gateway. In
order to ensure this, we added a feature to the socket han-
dling code that would, prior to the first outgoing packet,
indirectly add a routing rule to direct packets for the re-
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mote node’s public address to the LAN gateway. The
rule would remain in effect until the VPN closed down
or the link was closed. This model requires unique code
for each OS platform; though supporting Linux and Win-
dows was quite trivial. Because outgoing packets bear
the source address of the physical network, incoming
packets will be delivered normally.
This method has two major shortcomings. Common
to all VPNs that employ the standard route switch tech-
nique, all communication, not just VPN, is routed di-
rectly to the server insecurely. So while the VPN traffic
is most likely encrypted, a website hosted by the server
might not be. Another issue that arises in the P2P case is
that malicious users can send spoofed initiation packets
which will add extra routes to the routing table, resulting
in a similar situation as the first, unencrypted commu-
nication visible to eavesdroppers. This led to a second
approach described below.
4.3.4 The Client – Approach 2 – Ethernet Frames
This solution attempts to solve the problem introduced
by the first solution, removing any potential for eaves-
dropping. In this solution all Internet packets with no
exception are directed to the VN device. The VN is then
responsible for filtering P2P traffic, encapsulating them
into Ethernet packets, and sending to the LAN’s gateway.
In the VPN application, Incoming IP packets’ source
ports are compared to VPN application’s source ports.
Upon a match, the VPN application must direct it to the
LAN’s gateway. The three steps involved in this process
are 1) translating the source IP address to match the phys-
ical Ethernet’s IP address, 2) encapsulating the IP packet
in an Ethernet packet whose source is a random address
as described in [41] and destination is the LAN’s gate-
way, and 3) sending the packet via the physical Ethernet
device. The IP swap is required or the gateway will not
route the packet properly. The issue of sending the Eth-
ernet packet is not trivial as Windows lacks support this
operation. Our platform independent solution uses a sec-
ond TAP device bridged to the physical Ethernet device,
allowing Ethernet packets to be sent indirectly through
the Ethernet device via the TAP device. This solution
currently only works for UDP packets, because all in-
coming packets will be directed towards the bridge and
not the faked Ethernet address. TCP packets will send a
TCP reset in this environment. All other packets enter the
system same as before. This method has been verified to
work on both Linux and Windows using OS dependent
TAP devices and bridge utilities.
While this method effectively resolves the lingering
problem of ensuring that all packets in a full tunnel will
be secure, it raises a couple of issues 1) could the ef-
fect of having all packets traverse the VPN application
be prohibitively expensive and 2) why not have the P2P
application write LAN destined Ethernet packets directly
avoiding the VPN client. The cost of passing all packets
through the VPN application is negligible, as shown in
Section 5.4, since they are destined for the wide area,
where the time to traverse the network will be orders of
magnitude larger than passing through the VPN’s packet
processor. Adding an Ethernet writer to the P2P system
creates an unclean abstraction as a VPN portion of the
system now becomes library dependent and reduces VPN
software portability.
4.4 Autonomic Relays
When NAT traversal using STUN [33] fails or there
are other connectivity issues some P2P VPNs [26, 25]
support relaying, similar to Traversal Using Relay NAT
(TURN) [32] provided by a managed relay infrastruc-
ture. Centralized and decentralized VPNs do not suffer
from this problem as all traffic passes through the central
server or managed links. To address the management
and overhead concerns in these systems, we propose the
use of distributed, autonomic relaying system based upon
previous work [17, 29]. Our previous work involved the
use of triangular routing that allowed peers next to each
other in the node ID space to communicate despite be-
ing unable to communicate directly because of firewall,
NAT, or Internet fragmentation issues.
The process for forming local relays or ”tunnels” [17]
begins with two nodes discovering each other via ex-
isting peers and determining the need to be connected.
If a direct connection attempt fails, the peers exchange
neighbor sets through the overlay. Upon receiving this
list, the two peers use the overlap in the neighbor sets to
form a two-hop connection. In this work, we further ex-
tend this model to support cases when nodes do not have
an overlap set. This involves having the peers connect to
each other’s neighbor set proactively creating overlap, as
represented in Figure 4.
Additionally, we added the feature to exchange arbi-
trary information along with the neighbor list. So far we
have implemented systems that pass information about
node stability (measured by the age of a connection) and
proximity (based upon ping latency to neighbors). Ad-
ditionally, when overlap changes, we make it optional to
select to use only a subset of the overlap, thus only the
fastest or most stable overlap is used with many more in
reserve.
To verify the usefulness of two-hop over overlay rout-
ing, we performed experiments and share the results in
Section 5.1. In a live system, we verify the accuracy and
usefulness of our latency-based relay selection algorithm
in Section 5.2.
5 Evaluation of VPN Models
In this section, we evaluate our proposed P2P VPN as
described in Section 4 implementing the features into
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Figure 4: Creating relays across the node address space, when
direct connectivity is not possible. Two members, 0000 and
ABCD, desire a direct connection but are unable to directly
connect, perhaps due to NATs or firewalls. They exchange
neighbor information through the overlay and connect to one of
each other’s neighbors, creating an overlap. The overlap then
becomes a relay path (represented by dashed lines), improving
performance over routing across the entire overlay.
IPOP [41] and Brunet [4]. We present the advantage
of using relays over overlay routing when NAT traversal
does not work. Then we examine the effects of using dif-
ferent relay selection mechanisms. Afterwards, we eval-
uate the system overheads of OpenVPN, Hamachi, and
our P2P VPN to determine the OS resource costs and the
cost of each in a distributed environment. Finally, we
present a quantitative comparison of our two full tunnel
models.
5.1 Motivation for Relays in the Overlay
The purpose of this experiment is to quantify the per-
formance benefits of autonomic relays. For this experi-
ment we use the MIT King data set [22], a data set con-
taining all-to-all latencies between 1,740 well-distributed
Internet hosts. We reviewed many different sizes of net-
works up to 1,740 nodes, evaluating each network size
100 times. Our experiments were executed by running
the VPN software in simulated mode, which reuses the
code base of IPOP to faithfully implement its function-
ality, but using event-driven simulated times to emulate
WAN latencies in a LAN environment. Once at steady
state, we then calculate the average all-to-all latency for
all messages that would have taken two overlay hops or
more, the average of our low latency relay model, and the
average of single hop communication. In the low latency
relay model, each destination node form a connection to
the source node’s physically closest peer as determined
via latency (in a live system by application level ping).
Then this pathway is used as a two-hop relay between
source and node. We only look at two overlay hops and
more, as a single hop would not necessarily benefit from
the work and would be the cause of a triangular inequal-
ity. The simulations were performed on a distributed grid
platform, Archer [14], that uses IPOP for its virtual net-
working component.
Figure 5: A comparison of the average all-to-all overlay rout-
ing, two-hop relay, and direct connection latency in a Struc-
tured P2P environment, Brunet, using the King data set.
Our results are presented in Figure 5. We performed
the tests for varying network sizes. We began our tests
at 25, because network sizes around 20 and under tend
to be fully connected due to the connectivity require-
ments of the system. It is not until the network size
expands past 100 and towards 200 nodes that relays be-
come significantly beneficial. At 100 nodes, there is ap-
proximately a 54% performance increase, whereas at 200
there is an 87% increase and it appears to grow propor-
tionately to the size of the pool. The key take away is
that latency-bound applications using a reasonably sized
overlay would significantly benefit from the use of two-
hop relays.
5.2 Comparing Relay Selection
In this experiment, we share our experience of test-
ing the use of latency-aware relays using our public P2P
pool running on Planet-Lab as well as Hamachi-Free and
Hamachi-Pro relays. Due to Hamachi not supporting re-
lays in Linux, this experiment was performed in Win-
dows Vista 64-bit. The testing platform consists of two
virtual machine located on the same host with a fire-
wall preventing them from establishing direct connec-
tions. All experiments were repeated 5 times using a
clean configuration each time. In Hamachi, this meant
that the server would need to re-evaluate NAT traversing
capabilities and the optimal relay to use. In IPOP, this
meant that the VPNs would generate a new node ID and
become peers with different members of the overlay. Our
results are presented in Table 3.
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Latency Bandwidth
(ms) stdev Kbit/s stdev
Hamachi-Free 60.8 2.54 40.2 0.87
Hamachi-Pro 60.2 1.68 1000 1.29
Latency-aware 58.1 35.5 2245 1080
Table 3: Results of the evaluation comparing latency and band-
width of Hamachi relays and IPOP latency-aware autonomic
relay selection.
As Hamachi was started and figured out that NAT
traversal was not possible, it began using multiple dif-
ferent relays as evident by several different ping times.
Eventually Hamachi settled on a relay server and it ap-
peared to be the same one every time, for both Hamachi-
Free and Hamachi-Pro. The only difference between
Hamachi-Pro and Hamachi-Free is that in Pro there is a
bandwidth cap of approximately 1 Mbit/s whereas Free
is limited to 40 Kbit/s.
The P2P system IPOP used has nodes both on Planet-
Lab but also dedicated systems for Archer [14]. These
machines are at Universities and thus have a high band-
width and low latency connection to the testing site. As
witnessed by the results, it appears that in most if not all
these experiments peers had a low latency connection to
a University compute resource and it was chosen ahead
of Planet-Lab.
The two apparent take aways are 1) the benefit of being
able to deploy your own relay servers and to reuse com-
pute nodes as relay systems and 2) as our network grows,
we too may need to implement some form of bandwidth
limit at relay nodes.
5.3 Comparing System Overheads
In this experiment, we attempt to understand the
bounds imposed by OpenVPN, Hamachi, and IPOP. We
used Amazon EC2 [2] to dynamically create various
sized networks ranging from 1 to 129 with one client
used as the control. In the bootstrap phase, the con-
trol machine initiates communication with a subset of
the remaining clients in the VPN. Once the system has
warmed, the control continues pinging this subset every
15 seconds for the next 10 minutes. We capture bytes
transmitted into and out of the system, as well as the
memory size of the VPN application at the end of each
stage. As we test the varying network sizes, we begin by
communicating with 0 peers and exponentially increase
the amount (powers of two) until the control is commu-
nicating with all members of the VPN. For these evalua-
tions, we used a licensed version of Hamachi, but due to
very recent changes in Hamachi, the Linux client will not
support networks larger than 16. Due to amount of data
collected and space limitations, we only present figures
for results that provide interesting data and summarize
the rest in the text.
Memory, for the most part, exhibited an intuitive be-
havior: for each additional connection there was more
memory used. The OpenVPN control client showed neg-
ligible additional memory usage for additional nodes,
though the server showed a linear increment, around 1
MB, for each additional client in the system, while ac-
tivity had negligible effect on the results. Hamachi had a
base line of a less than 1 MB and like OpenVPN, each ad-
ditional client in the system had a linear effect on mem-
ory, on the order of 4 KB, there was no change based
upon activity. The effect of additional inactive nodes
in an IPOP network had negligible effect on memory,
unlike Hamachi and OpenVPN. The only time IPOP’s
memory consumption increased was during activity and
it scaled at a 200 KB per additional node.
Figure 6: Comparison of bandwidth costs for member activ-
ity versus network size. As stated in the text, Hamachi limits
the system to network sizes of 16, so to estimate the Hamachi
bandwidth we used the following formula using a linear regres-
sion model based upon our data sets: .049+ .002KB/s∗N +
.02KB/s ∗ A, .049 the bandwidth in a network size of 0, i.e.,
keep-alives with the central server, N is the network size, and
A is the active links.
In Figures 6, we present the bandwidth results for
client network sizes of 128. Our evaluation scaled from
having the control communicate with 0 to 128 clients ex-
ponentially, though as mentioned already, Hamachi only
supports network sizes of 16, so we used a linear regres-
sion to extrapolate the bandwidth results. The results
are somewhat predictable as Brunet, IPOP’s P2P infras-
tructure, primarily uses UDP connections and thus must
maintain application layer connections and NAT map-
pings. It is not obvious that Hamachi is doing the same,
which may be due to the fact that the peers all have pub-
lic IP addresses. In fact, Hamachi’s behavior appears to
be similar to that of OpenVPN. Additionally, OpenVPN
does not need to maintain NAT mappings as the servers
are location on public addresses, thus a client does not
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need to be as proactive about ensuring the connection
like in IPOP and Hamachi.
The important take-aways from this experiment are: 1)
each additional member in a VPN requires more mem-
ory, but the structured P2P approach places this bur-
den only on the individual client and only when there
is active communication; 2) maintaining NAT mappings
through keep-alive messages (a ping every 15 seconds)
requires very little bandwidth; and 3) all traffic routes
through the OpenVPN server and it pays twice for each
inter-client packet thus as inter-client communication in-
creases OpenVPN server’s bandwidth becomes a bottle-
neck.
5.4 Full Tunnel Overhead
This experiment was done to evaluate the overhead
introduced using our Ethernet packet based full tunnel
technique. The environment for this experiment consists
of a VPN client and gateway located at a residence and
University, respectively. The gateway is configured using
Linux with iptables’ masquerading. The client is also us-
ing Linux. The test performed consist of calculating the
average latency, through a minutes worth of ping mea-
surements, between the client and Google as well as the
gateway’s public and private addresses.
Google GW Pri GW Pub
Ethernet 70.6 12.9 13.9
Routing 71.4 13.2 11.0
None 66.1 N/A 10.9
Table 4: Latency results comparing full tunnel approaches
measured in ms. GW Pri is the gateways VPN address, GW
Pub is the gateways public address, Ethernet was the Ethernet
packet writing full tunnel method, routing was the routing ta-
ble manipulation method, and none is the baseline without any
VPN software.
As shown in Table 4, there is not a significant latency
difference in the full tunnel approaches. One interest-
ing result is the latency to gateways public address in the
routing test, which is a result of the ping being sent inse-
curely avoiding the VPN stack completely.
6 Experiences
Our work on the P2P VPN model presented in this pa-
per is based on four years of work spent developing, de-
ploying, and maintaining VN software for grid comput-
ing [16, 41, 14]. In this section, we first present our dif-
ferent deployments of our P2P VPN and then our experi-
ences in debugging such a structured P2P VPN system.
6.1 Deployments
Initially IPOP was designed to assist in self-
configuring ad hoc grid deployments using virtualiza-
tion, as part of the “Grid Appliance” project [40]. Over
the years, the Grid Appliance has matured and so has our
usage of IPOP. Currently, the Grid Appliance is used as
the basis for a free-to-join computer architecture consist-
ing of over 400 compute resources spanning 5 seed uni-
versities with users across the United States and abroad.
The Grid Appliance allows easy creation of ad hoc, dis-
tributed grids through the use of the IPOP and the struc-
tured P2P DHT. Experienced users can use the system to
create large grids in less than an hour with most of the
time spent waiting for virtual machines to boot. Non-
expert users can quickly access the distributed grid in
a matter of minutes by downloading a virtual machine
manager and the Grid Appliance. The comment we re-
ceive most often in our polls is “I was surprised at how it
just works.”
Motivation for a significant portion of our work lies
in a desire to integrate other resources, not only vir-
tual appliances, in the same “just works” manner. The
GroupVPN described in this paper is the same software
stack that runs inside Grid Appliance but also allows ser-
vices the Grid Appliance to connect with external NFS
and external grid resources.
Our experience with P2P VPN software also includes
SocialVPN [13]. The SocialVPN places each client in
their own private network, where they are only address-
able by their friends as defined by third party social net-
work. Unlike GroupVPN, this makes each user the mas-
ter of who does and does not have access to their re-
sources. While SocialVPN targets the creation of “per-
sonal” VPNs, which are often asymmetrical, it does not
lend itself well to environments that require some form
of central management and symmetric connectivity such
as a computing grid or a small to medium businesses.
6.2 Discovering Faults
In this section, we share our experiences in manag-
ing and finding faults in a deployed P2P VPN overlay
bootstrap service we run on Planet-Lab [8]. Planet-Lab
serves as a challenging environment that stresses our sys-
tem and helps us assess its reliability, stability, and con-
sistency. The basic consistency check we use to discover
faults is to compare peers knowledge of the pool and test
each peer for congruence with both its first and second
left and right neighbors. We call this a crawl. This in-
formation is stored in a database, which we can later use
to find nodes that have been inconsistent many consec-
utive times. If a node is able to fix inconsistencies in
future crawls, experience suggests the inconsistency was
probably due to churn in the system. Otherwise, it will
probably still be in an inconsistent state and we are able
to query the node and other nodes nearby for additional
state information. At a minimum, this would be help us
determine if there exists a problem and potentially the
stale state causing the connectivity issue. If this reveals
11
little information, we either retrieve a log or request it
from the user who owns node. The log typically pro-
vides some useful information. Additionally, as with all
multithreaded applications, deadlocks happen, we found
it useful to add liveness states to threads to assist in find-
ing deadlocks.
Other information we monitor includes peer count,
memory, and CPU usage. Node count can be quite diffi-
cult to keep track of in Planet-Lab as machines at a rate
of 5 to 20 per day are restarted and our software is not
automatically restarted on these machines, thus the case
to watch for is non-linear loss of nodes. Planet-Lab also
places challenges on memory, as the systems can often
be I/O starved causing what appears to be memory leaks
as Brunet’s internal queue can grow without bound. In
these cases, we have the node disconnect from the over-
lay and sleep before returning. The advantage of Planet-
Lab as a test ground is that it presents so many unique
situations that can be very difficult to reproduce in a lab
controlled test system. It is our belief that any system
that uses large scale Planet-Lab deployments as a testing
ground will be quite reliable.
We are still actively seeking better ways to check and
verify the state of our system. For example, the cost of
doing a crawl can take O(N log(N)) time, since we have
to communicate with every single node with an average
routing time of O(log(N)). Future work in the arena is
focused on Brunet’s MapReduce [9] framework, which
can be used to provide system wide searches and status
checks in O(log(N)) time.
7 Related Works
Our work is not the first to propose using a group like
mechanism for regulating members in a VPN. Hamachi
presently offers the ability to create and join a network
from either a VPN client or through their Web site. To
create a group, a user can either form a private invite only
VPN or a password protected public VPN. Users must
exchange out of band both the password and the VPNs
name and both registered and unregistered users (guest)
can join Hamachi VPNs. Also, Hamachi uses a model
similar to a key distribution center (KDC) as opposed to
a PKI, thus it is quite easy for Hamachi to do man-in-the-
middle attacks. Hamachi’s server is not redistributable
and all users must use LogMeIn’s (Hamachi’s owner)
KDC and relays. Our model ensures that each user is
traceable and has to be authenticated by the group ad-
ministrator. The groups is further secured by giving each
user a unique key to retrieve signed certificates. Most
importantly our PKI is open and redistributable, so users
can self-host the group VPN web server, and our relays
are built into the VPN and require no management.
Our group system is not the first to provide an
automatic PKI. Previous work in this field includes
RobotCA [1]. A RobotCAs receives request via e-mail,
verifies that the sender’s e-mail address and embedded
PGP key match, signs the request, and mails it back to the
sender. RobotCAs are only as secure as the underlying
e-mail infrastructure and provide no guarantees about the
person beyond their ownership of an e-mail address. In
certain cases, this model could be used in our use cases,
such as a SMB or for universities if it enforces that all
users use university e-mail addresses, then the RobotCA
would only sign e-mails if they come from a specific do-
main. Our experience suggests that is not rare for an aca-
demic to use a non-university e-mail for university pur-
poses. Another concern is that the RobotCA would re-
quire management to limit allowed users to members of
a class or an organization whose e-mail addresses does
not contain domain names.
VINI [3], a network infrastructure for evaluating
new protocols and services, uses OpenVPN along with
Click [23] to provide access from a VINI instance to out-
side hosts, as an ingress mechanism. OpenVPN only
supports a single server and gateway per a client and
does support distributed load balancing. VINI may ben-
efit from using a VPN that uses a full tunnel model sim-
ilar to ours, as it lends itself readily to interesting load
balancing schemes.
Our work is not the first to suggest using a P2P in-
frastructure to enable the discovery of physically close
TURN-like relays. Skype [21] queries super nodes in
an attempt to find physically close relays. The primary
difference in our work is that our model could easily be
configured to let users create and select their own relays.
7.1 P2P VPN in Other Structured Overlays
The purpose of this work is to develop a P2P VPN
model that can easily be applied to other structured P2P
systems. In this section, we focus on the portability of
our platform to other structured P2P systems, namely
Pastry and Chord by analyzing FreePastry and NChord
respectively. FreePastry can easily reuse our C# imple-
mented library through the use of IKVM.NET, which al-
lows the porting of Java code into the CLR. NChord is
a Chord implementation written in C#. In Table 5, we
compare the features of the structured P2P systems as
they apply to the use as a VPN. The specific focus of this
section is to understand how discovery and VPN con-
nections would work. Our discovery model for mapping
node ID to IP works through the use of a DHT. During
the IP address allocation, the VPN client will place in the
DHT a key, value pair mapping a virtual IP to a node ID,
as described in [41].
The bootstrapping of a connection in NChord be-
gins by finding the owner of the DHT key containing
the mapping of virtual IP address to node ID through
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System Overlay messaging NAT Traversal DHT Secure PtP Secure EtE
Brunet Yes (AHSender) UDP and overlay
relaying Yes with reliability Yes Yes
FreePastry Yes (route) Only with port-forwarding enabled
Yes, PAST [35], reli-
able No No
NChord No, only look up No Simple, non-fault
tolerant DHT No No
Table 5: A comparison of structured P2P systems. PtP stands for point-to-point communication, such as communication between
physical connections in a P2P overlay. EtE stands for end-to-end communication, such as messages routed over the overlay between
two peers.
“find successor”. After establishing a connection with
the owner of that key, the owner needs to query for its
value, which would be the node ID of the node own-
ing the virtual IP. After executing “find successor” and
retrieving the destination nodes physical IP address, the
VPN can “connect” to the remote node using either a
UDP or TCP socket. Virtual IP messages would then
be sent and received through this “connection”. Unlike
our system, NChord does not support sending messages
through the overlay, thus a separate “connection” for ap-
plication purposes will need to be created.
FreePastry begins by looking up the mapping of vir-
tual IP to node ID in PAST. To form a connection through
overlay, the VPN client would use “route” to send pack-
ets and “deliver” to receive incoming packets. In fact, the
model is very similar to Brunet. Furthermore, FreePas-
try has knowledge of proximity in shortcuts, so it may be
very easy to apply high-performance autonomic relays
in pastry potentially reusing some of their work from
ePost [29]. FreePastry does not form shortcuts based
upon communication demands, so if two peers were ac-
tively communicating, they may always have to route
traffic over the overlay, which in most cases will be sig-
nificantly slower than if they were directly connected.
Though one could argue that since FreePastry does not
support NAT traversal, all nodes will already be public
and thus an application, as in the NChord example, could
form a direct connection bypassing the overlay.
8 Conclusions
This paper presents a novel VPN approach that has been
designed from the ground up to facilitate ease of use
while maintaining a reasonable level of security. At the
core of the VPN is a structured P2P system that provides
decentralized peer discovery, NAT traversal, relays, full
tunnel clients and gateways, and secure point-to-point
(PtP) and end-to-end (EtE) links. In the paper, we focus
primarily on relays, full tunnels, and group security. The
relay seekers can use arbitrary information, such as con-
nection age or latency, to assist in finding suitable over-
lap. With overlap sets formed, relays will be created au-
tomatically using an existing infrastructure. We present a
novel method for client-side full tunneling that works in
P2P and provides a level of security not present in prior
works by ensuring that only secure data is transmitted
over the LAN. The PtP and EtE links are secured via a
group system using a partially automated PKI with an in-
tuitive web interface, which can be hosted by a group or
they may use our public system [40].
Through the use of the group interface, users can cre-
ate their own VPNs with private P2P pools while using
public pools as a bootstrap. Users are able to join the
system by downloading a stock VPN and loading it with
their user specific configuration or binary blob. The VPN
will automatically connect to the appropriate web server
and both parties will verify each other’s authenticity. The
user is then quickly connected to the VPN. Administra-
tors are able to police the system through the web inter-
face and offending users are eventually removed from the
system through one of the following mechanisms: CRL,
DHT events, and broadcast messages.
The paper introduces many new interesting research
problems: 1) distributed load balancing of full tunnel
gateways, 2) understanding the long term effects of dif-
ferent automatic relay selection models, 3) understand-
ing the benefits beyond security of using a private over-
lay for a VPN. We believe that this work provides both a
position and a model on how to design VPNs.
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